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As Myanmar’s long-simmering Rohingya crisis boils over into ethnic cleansing, 
refugee exodus and possible civil war, there are inevitable calls for economic 
sanctions to be reimposed on Myanmar’s military-dominated government. The 
outgoing Obama administration lifted U.S. economic sanctions on Myanmar, also 
known as Burma, in late 2016 in recognition of its partial transition to democracy 
under de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Now the Nobel Peace Prize laureate finds 
herself the subject of international condemnation for her failure to act toward, or even 
to speak in favor of, a peaceful resolution to the crisis.  
 
There is no hint of the United States, or any other country, intervening militarily to 
protect Myanmar’s Rohingya. Instead, the solution is likely to be sanctions, as it has 
been elsewhere. When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, the U.S. and the European 
Union replied with sanctions. In Syria, the military tide may be turning in favor of 
President Bashar al-Assad’s forces, but U.S. and EU sanctions are constantly 
tightening the net around his regime. Even North Korea’s missile and nuclear 
provocations, including implied threats to strike the U.S. with a thermonuclear bomb, 
have been met, so far, with sanctions; the only real point of contention among world 
powers has centered on how strong they should be.  
 
 
Geopolitics is dead. Long live geoeconomics. Since the turn of the millennium, 
the geoeconomics of sanctions and sweeteners has slowly been replacing the 
geopolitics of diplomacy and war. With U.S. forces actively engaged across a wide 
swath of Africa and the Middle East, the transition from geopolitics to geoeconomics 
may not seem all that obvious. But on closer inspection, it becomes clear that 
military intervention these days is limited to places that lack functioning economies 
that can be effectively sanctioned. Most of the world, and all of the economically 
productive world, lies in the sphere of geoeconomics. 
 
That economically productive section of the world, spanning the Atlantic and Pacific 
basins with North America at its center, incorporates more than 80 percent of global 
GDP into an interwoven fabric of transnational production networks. In this zone of 
integration, outright war is obsolete as a tool of foreign policy. Those who suggest 
that the “great powers” of today might repeat the mistakes of 1914 and stumble into 
war fail to understand that 21st century economic integration is much deeper than 
the international trade of the early 20th century. It’s hard to imagine China invading 
Taiwan when Taiwanese firms employ more than 15 million people in China itself. 
 
The U.S. still maintains by far the most powerful—and most expensive—military 
force in the world. China will find it very difficult to catch up, even more so as its 
economic growth slows. But military power is less and less the main source of 
American influence in the world. If the U.S. was the preeminent geopolitical power of 
the 20th century, it is the geoeconomic behemoth of the 21st. The U.S. may account 
for a declining share of global GDP, but its corporations increasingly dominate global 
value chains and its institutions hold overwhelming sway at international forums. Just 
as important, the U.S. is at the center of the financial, technological, educational and 
other networks that form the backbone of the 21st-century global economy. 
The centrality of the U.S. in the 21st-century 
economy makes it a new kind of sanctions 
superpower. 
 
Geoeconomic power is generated more by centrality than by sheer size, and the 
centrality of the U.S. in the 21st-century economy makes it a new kind of sanctions 
superpower. Few people are even aware of EU sanctions that are not part of larger 
American-coordinated efforts. Countries don’t worry much about being the target of 
Russian economic sanctions, and China tends to offer economic carrots rather than 
punish with economic sticks. The EU, Russia and China all have some geoeconomic 
power, but only the U.S. has the power to exclude individuals, firms or even entire 
countries from participation in the larger global economy. In the realm of 
geoeconomics, the U.S. isn’t just a major player, or even the lone superpower. Quite 
simply, it exercises many of the functions of a global government. 
 
The New Middle Kingdom 
 
The U.S. is in effect the spider at the center of the web of the integrated global 
economy. This position makes it disproportionately influential and by far the most 
powerful player in the new great power game of geoeconomics. The dominance of 
the U.S. dollar is well known, and the global financial system has been centered on 
the U.S. since the end of World War I, when France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom all found themselves financially dependent on New York, America’s 
financial capital. But today the virtual infrastructure of the internet, operating 
systems, app stores and the entire online economy is also centered on the U.S., as 
are the worlds of higher education, science, medicine, publishing, business services 
and a host of other “post-industrial” industries. 
 
From Asia to Europe, the giants of China, Japan and Germany also host key nodes 
in the 21st-century economy, but American firms and institutions predominate 
because they occupy leading positions not just in one or two fields, but in nearly 
every field simultaneously. This generates network effects that multiply American 
influence. What’s more, many of the leading firms and institutions that are not 
American are based in countries that are closely allied to the United States. Twenty-
two of the 28 EU member states are also members of NATO; Canada, Australia, 
Japan and South Korea are all close U.S. allies; Taiwan is in effect a U.S. 
protectorate. 
 
The world’s only major economic power that is not a U.S. ally is China, but China is 
highly dependent on investment from and exports to the U.S. and its allies. Many of 
the most productive and profitable niches in China’s own economy are foreign-
owned, with China’s moribund state-owned enterprises claiming the majority of what 
remains. Even China’s world-class internet companies are locked into an American-
managed industrial infrastructure. Google search may be blocked in China, but 99 
percent of Chinese mobile phones run Google’s Android or Apple’s iOS operating 
system. 
 
The centrality of the U.S. in what has been called the “zone of integration” created by 
the globalization of the world’s economy is a new phenomenon, but it’s not 
unprecedented. In the premodern era, before the emergence of a single global 
economy, the world was fragmented into separate regional economies. One of those 
regional economies was the East Asian economy centered on China. The English 
word for China descends from the ancient Roman and Greek name, “Sinae,” or the 
“the land of the Qin,” named for China’s founding Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.). But in 
Chinese, China is simply Zhongguo, the “Central State” or, more poetically, the 
“Middle Kingdom.” Premodern China was always at the center of its own world. 
 
In all the other major languages of East Asia, China is also called by some variant of 
Zhongguo. Some other countries even defined themselves in relation to China. 
Japan is the “land of the rising sun”—as seen from China. The “nam” in Vietnam 
means “south,” placing Vietnam to the south of China. Japan and Vietnam, along 
with Korea, Mongolia, Tibet and much of Southeast Asia, once formed an integrated 
economic region centered on China. The Chinese name for this area, which 
represented the world as seen from China, was tianxia, meaning “sky-encompassed” 
or “all under heaven.” 
 
By the time of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1363-1644), the Chinese tianxia was an 
integrated economic zone covering all of East Asia and extending at times into the 
Indian Ocean as far west as Somalia and Tanzania. This precursor to globalization 
with China at the center was the historical inspiration for Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s One Belt, One Road initiative, known as OBOR. The two components of 
OBOR—the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road—are 
explicitly designed to put China back at the economic center of the Afro-Eurasian 
landmass. The Chinese government clearly appreciates the geoeconomic value of 
centrality. 
 
 
The problem for China is that although the OBOR strategy of “build it and they will 
come” might work for the physical infrastructure of ports and railways, it is not an 
effective way to improve China’s position in the virtual infrastructure of the 21st-
century economy. Centrality in human networks depends very little on physical 
connectivity. China can send all the rail cars in the world chugging across Central 
Asia to Western Europe, but it won’t change the fact that Western Europeans are 
more likely to use Facebook than WeChat—and more likely to educate their children 
in North America than in China. 
 
The fact that Chinese parents are themselves beating down the doors to educate—
and even give birth to—their children in North America makes the prospect of a new 
Chinese tianxia even more remote. Instead, as Chinese individuals seek out the 
most advantageous positions for themselves and their families in global economic 
networks, they reinforce the centrality of the U.S. in those networks. As a result, the 
U.S. is becoming a kind of new Middle Kingdom of what might be called an American 
Tianxia. The emerging American Tianxia is very different in language, culture and 
politics from the old Chinese tianxia, but it does share one crucial trait: the leveraging 
of network centrality into world-spanning geoeconomic power. 
 
The Zone of Irrelevance 
 
The historian Wang Gungwu, writing in 2013, was the first to suggest that the 
Chinese term tianxia might be applied to today’s American-centered world. He 
described the word tianxia as depicting “an enlightened realm that Confucian 
thinkers and mandarins raised to one of universal values that determined who was 
civilized and who was not” and suggested that today’s American Tianxia performs 
the same function. Replace “Confucian thinkers and mandarins” with “political 
pundits and NGOs” and you get the point.  
 
The globalized people who participate in the networks of the American Tianxia—the 
journalists, think tankers, businesspeople, academics and other opinion leaders who 
are much more closely tied to the U.S. than to, say, Syria or North Korea—get to 
mold the image of nations and their leaders, with clear results. It’s no mystery what 
they think of Assad, Kim Jong Un or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—or even Vladimir Putin 
and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who are skating on thin ice. By contrast, Saudi and 
Emirati attempts to stigmatize Qatar have fallen flat, since Qatar is in many ways the 
most liberal of the Gulf states. And with a reported 11,000 U.S. military personnel 
based in Qatar, it is unlikely that the U.S. would ever bring its full geoeconomic 
power to bear against the Qatari government. Reversing his initial condemnation of 
Qatar, even U.S. President Donald Trump is now offering to mediate the dispute. 
 
 
China can send all the rail cars in the world 
chugging toward Western Europe, but it won’t 
change the fact that Europeans are more likely to 
use Facebook than WeChat. 
 
The world may seem to be awash in conflict today, but terrible as those wars may 
be, they are concentrated in countries that are peripheral to the larger global 
economy. Conflict hotspots like Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Ukraine, Myanmar 
and Yemen are only tenuously connected to the outside world and are completely 
excluded from sophisticated global production networks. They form what from a 
geopolitical perspective has been called the “zone of intervention” but which from a 
geoeconomic perspective might just as well be called the “zone of irrelevance.” Who 
wins these wars may make an enormous difference to the people who live in the 
countries affected, but it will have no meaningful impact on the larger global 
economy. 
 
Geoeconomic stigmatization via the imposition of economic sanctions is also 
focused on countries that are relatively isolated from global economic networks. 
Autarkic Russia is routinely criticized for its democratic failures, yet globally 
networked China is not a democracy at all. It is perhaps no coincidence that while it 
costs the U.S. very little to sanction Russia, it would cost a fortune to sanction China. 
The distinction between civilization and barbarism in the American Tianxia may be 
based on the acceptance of universal values, but it is mainly American pundits and 
NGOs who make the distinction, and these days they’re much better networked with 
China than with Russia. As a result, China tends to get a pass from the Western 
expert class, at least for now. Russia does not. 
 
The few remaining “hot” conflicts or crises that affect economically consequential 
areas of the world, like the ones in Iraq and North Korea, are legacies of 20th-
century geopolitics. They also involve countries that are not themselves integrated 
into 21st-century value chains. Iraq may be oil-rich and North Korea surrounded by 
advanced economies, but neither is itself very well networked economically. Their 
very irrelevance, ironically, limits their susceptibility to geoeconomic pressure. 
Islamic State forces in Iraq must be confronted by military power precisely because 
they have no formal economy to govern, even if they have overseen a black market 
for oil. North Korea is similarly relatively immune to sanctions because its economy 
is so meager.  
 
China is particularly careful to keep its geopolitical conflict zones clear of 
geoeconomic entanglements. China has broadly supported the U.S. in applying 
economic sanctions on North Korea because China no longer has any geopolitical 
use for North Korea. By contrast, in the South China Sea, where China does have 
geopolitical interests, it ensures that these do not interfere with the smooth 
functioning of important economic systems. It may be true that one-third of global 
ocean trade passes through the South China Sea, but it is less often pointed out that 
most of that trade is China’s. Thus China speaks loudly but carries a small stick 
when it comes to the possibility of real conflict in the South China Sea. 
 
China’s recently resolved Doklam Plateau standoff on its border with India and 
Bhutan similarly illustrates China’s separation of geopolitics from economics. The 
Doklam Plateau is almost literally in the middle of nowhere. China’s road-building 
there was in many ways similar to its island-building in the South China Sea. Both 
represent the development of infrastructure in remote locations in order to establish 
a permanent Chinese presence in previously unoccupied territories. They are bold 
geopolitical provocations, but they are geoeconomically irrelevant. With China, as in 
the rest of the world, geopolitical conflicts are confined to the zone of irrelevance. In 
the parts of the world that matter, geoeconomics is the order of the day. 
 
Belts and BRICS 
 
With its OBOR initiative, China is at the forefront of moving from geopolitics to 
geoeconomics as the basis of its foreign relations. Unlike in the Doklam and the 
South China Sea, China has no territorial ambitions along its belt and road routes. 
Instead, it seeks to leverage economic statecraft for political gain. For example, not 
long after Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO made a major 
investment in Athens’ port of Piraeus, the Greek government blocked an EU effort to 
criticize China’s human rights record. Similarly, at China’s behest the Dalai Lama 
has repeatedly been denied a visa to enter South Africa. South Africa is a major 
beneficiary of Chinese largesse that has gained entry into the BRICS summit club—
joining Brazil, Russia, India and China—entirely at China’s behest. 
 
The problem for China is that it does not control access to major global networks that 
people value for their own sake. As a result, China’s geoeconomic checkbook 
diplomacy is fundamentally transactional. This is very different from the classical 
Chinese tianxia, under which the countries of East Asia valued access to China’s 
learning, technology and unique products and thus were willing to accept the 
trappings of nominal Chinese suzerainty in exchange for the privilege of trading with 
China. In the old tianxia, China was the center of the world and could use that 
position to its advantage. In the new geoeconomics, China must pay full price to 
meet its foreign policy goals. 
 
 
In its exercise of geoeconomic power, China 
rewards while the U.S. punishes. 
 
The most recent BRICS summit in early September is a case in point. Just a week 
before the opening of the summit in Xiamen, in eastern China’s Fujian province, 
Chinese and Indian troops were facing off on the remote Doklam Plateau 1,700 
miles to the west. But Xi presumably didn’t want to see the crisis disrupt an 
economic summit on his own home turf; early in his career he had served as deputy 
mayor of Xiamen and governor of Fujian. So he bought India off with a geopolitical 
withdrawal in order to meet his geoeconomic goals.  
 
China can afford its many geoeconomic initiatives—the BRICS-sponsored New 
Development Bank, its own Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, multiple OBOR 
initiatives, diplomatic offensives to isolate Taiwan—but the fact that it has to pay for 
them underlines the point that for China, geoeconomics is a costly game. China has 
to buy its friends. The U.S., by contrast, gets its friends for free. People are even 
willing to pay to join the U.S. “club,” as when countries buy U.S. airplanes or military 
hardware as the price of U.S. friendship. 
 
In its exercise of geoeconomic power, China rewards while the U.S. punishes. That’s 
because the U.S. is in the enviable position that mere access to its geoeconomic 
infrastructure is valuable in itself. Countries are not paying China for the privilege of 
joining OBOR; China is paying them to join. China has effectively paid India to keep 
quiet and stay in the BRICS, paid Greece to plead its case at the EU, and paid 
dozens of African countries to allow Chinese state-owned firms to build infrastructure 
at below-cost rates. China even donated a new headquarters building for the African 
Union—and sent a Chinese crew to Addis Ababa to build it. 
 
By contrast, more than a million international students—nearly a third of them 
Chinese—pay to study in the U.S., subsidizing American colleges while absorbing 
American values. More than 500 foreign companies are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, subjecting themselves to U.S. government oversight, and the U.S. 
dollar is on one side of the deal in 88 percent of all international currency 
transactions. The whole world relies on the American-dominated internet, the 
American-provided Global Positioning System (GPS) and American-owned computer 
and mobile phone operating systems. It is difficult to do business of any kind in 
today’s integrated economy without using U.S.-linked systems of one kind or 
another, which is why the U.S. is uniquely powerful in the imposition of economic 
sanctions. 
 
Geoeconomics isn’t everything, and sanctions may not be able to solve all of the 
world’s geopolitical crises. Sometimes boots on the ground and missiles in the air 
are the only ways to achieve important policy and humanitarian goals. But 
geoeconomics is increasingly important, and in that realm, the U.S. is vastly more 
powerful today than postwar America was in its Cold War heyday. It is worth 
remembering that the U.S. at its geopolitical zenith struggled to contain an 
impoverished China in the Korean War and failed to contain an impoverished North 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Today, geoeconomic centrality gives the U.S. much 
more power to influence the policies and behaviors of other countries than military 
force ever did. Hegemony is dead. Long live centrality. 
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